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Showing posts with label Remedial Social Legislation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Remedial Social Legislation. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 28, 2015

A More Efficient Process

The NJ Appellate Court reversed a Compensation Judge's dismissal of an employee's claim petition citing, delay in adjudication, and an inadequate record at the trial record.

The reviewing court in an opinion reversing the trial judge and reinstating the case wrote that the motion had lingered for too many years, ie. 4 years, the record below on the motion was vague and incomplete, and the legislative intent for an efficient and liberally construed process was not met.

The Appellate Division cited a 30 year old decision declaring the need for a more efficient process to adjudicate workers' compensation claims.

Roderick v. Taxi & Limousine Three, LLC
Not Reported in A.3d, 2015 WL 1859321 (N.J.Super.A.D. 2015)

Thursday, April 23, 2015

Equitable Relief Permits Reinstatement of Dismissed Workers’ Compensation Case

The principles of equitable relief were invoked by a NJ Appellate Court to restore a dismissed workers’ compensation case to the active calendar. 

The Appellate Court, reviewing the facts, considered that the original dismissal, was based on “omissions and misrepresentations” of his prior attorney and the "Petitioner's dilemma was not caused by his own dereliction or ambivalence."

The Appellate Court stated:

Although N.J.S.A. 34:15–54  does not expressly create an exception to the oneyear
requirement for filing a motion for reinstatement, our courts have recognized
that compensation judges possess the inherent power to excuse the one-year time
bar upon the grounds set forth in Rule  4:50–1. Beese v. First Nat'l Stores, 52
N.J. 196, 200 (1968) ; see also Estelle v. Bd. of Educ. of Red Bank,  14 N.J.  156,
261 (1954); Stone v. Dugan Bros. of N.J., 1 N.J.Super. 13, 16–17 (App.Div.1948) .
Relevant here is consideration of Rule  4:50–1(f), which provides that a court may
vacate a judgment for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment or order.”

When considering relief under that basis, “[n]o categorization can be made of
the situations which would warrant redress under subsection  (f) .... the very essence
of (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional situations. And in such
exceptional cases its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity
and justice.” Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966)  (citation omitted).