Workers' Compensation: Workers' Compensation Bar Prevails

The New Jersey Appellate Division affirms the exclusivity of workers' compensation in a workplace-fall case.

In a recent decision that reinforces the boundaries of employer liability in workplace accidents, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of VDM Metals USA, LLC, ruling that an injured employee's exclusive remedy lies within the Workers' Compensation system rather than through a civil tort claim.

The Facts of the Case

Jonathan Little worked as a material handler at VDM Metals' steel mill in Florham Park, New Jersey. On April 20, 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, staffing shortages led his supervisor to ask him to assist with unloading steel from a flatrack trailer—an open trailer with only front and back sides, sitting approximately five to six feet off the ground.

After the steel was removed, Little helped clear packing materials and debris from the trailer. While exiting, he fell to the ground and suffered a severe head injury despite wearing a helmet. The injury was so significant that Little could not recall the accident or provide details about his employment or the circumstances of his fall.

The investigation revealed critical safety lapses. A "Rollastep Mobile Platform"—a safety device designed to protect employees from falls when accessing surfaces at least four feet off the ground—was positioned near the trailer but wasn't being used at the time of the accident. Little's supervisor, Frendly Blas, was responsible for ensuring the rollastep's use but couldn't remember why it wasn't deployed during this incident.

An OSHA report noted that the rollastep was "generally not in use when there [we]re only a few plates" being unloaded, attributing the accident's primary cause to "complacency." Additionally, Little's forensic expert found no evidence in his training records showing he had received specific training on flatrack trailers.

The Legal Framework: A Historic Trade-Off

The Workers' Compensation Act embodies what courts have termed a "historic trade-off." Employees relinquish their right to pursue common-law tort remedies in exchange for prompt and automatic benefits for work-related injuries. Employers, in turn, accept strict liability for workplace injuries but receive protection from potentially unlimited civil damages.

This bargain is enshrined in N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, which states that if an injury is compensable under the Act, "a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong."

The Millison Standard and Its Evolution

The "intentional wrong" exception has been interpreted very narrowly to preserve the Act's underlying quid pro quo goals. As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in the landmark case Millison v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., if this exception were interpreted too broadly, it could "swallow up the entire 'exclusivity' provision" of the Act.

The Millison court established a rigorous two-prong test that plaintiffs must satisfy to overcome the Workers' Compensation bar:

The Conduct Prong: The employer must know that its actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee. Mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk is insufficient—the inquiry examines whether the employer's conduct evidenced "a virtual certainty" of death or injury.
The Context Prong: The resulting injury and circumstances must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Act to immunize.

This framework was further refined in Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., which clarified that OSHA violations alone do not automatically constitute intentional wrongs. Something more is typically required: deception, affirmative acts that defeat safety devices, or a willful failure to remedy past violations.

The Court's Analysis: Why Little's Claim Failed

The appellate court carefully examined whether Little presented sufficient evidence to meet either prong of the intentional wrong test.

1. Failure to Establish the Conduct Prong

The court found no evidence that VDM Metals acted with substantial certainty that harm would result from asking Little to assist with unloading the trailer. While the employer failed to utilize the rollastep during small unloading jobs, and OSHA attributed this to "complacency," several factors undermined Little's claim:

No evidence showed any employees had previously fallen from a trailer while unloading
Little wasn't actually unloading metal when he fell—he was exiting the trailer after work was completed
Little had received general fall prevention training, though not specifically for flatrack trailers
There was no evidence the employer was aware of a known or heightened danger specific to this task

The court emphasized a crucial distinction: "mere knowledge by an employer that a workplace is dangerous does not equate to an intentional wrong." The absence of the rollastep, even when combined with alleged training deficiencies, did not demonstrate that the employer was substantially certain harm would arise.

Drawing on Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., the court noted that intentional wrong cases typically involve common elements absent here: affirmative removal of safety devices, prior OSHA citations, deliberate deception about workplace conditions, knowledge of prior injuries or accidents, or previous employee complaints.

The court rejected the notion "that a longstanding negligent or reckless practice should be deemed an intentional wrong under the Act simply because the risk posed by an ongoing wrongful practice will eventually come to fruition under the law of probabilities."

2. The Context Prong Analysis

Although the court's finding on the conduct prong was dispositive, it addressed the context prong "for the sake of completeness." The contextual standard requires showing conduct that "violates the social contract so thoroughly" that the Legislature could not have intended to insulate it from civil remedies.

The court found that "complacency" regarding a safety measure was "far more akin to an immunized act of negligence than to the intentional or deceptive conduct the Act was not designed to protect." Moreover, transferring an employee to perform an atypical task due to an "unprecedented, unavoidable staffing shortage resulting from the pandemic" did not place these circumstances outside the heartland of workplace accidents, "part and parcel of everyday industrial life."

The Most Important Sentence

Among the court's extensive analysis, one sentence captures the essence of this decision and the principles underlying New Jersey's workers' compensation system:

"We have rejected the idea 'that a longstanding negligent or reckless practice should be deemed an intentional wrong under the [Act] simply because the risk posed by an ongoing wrongful practice will eventually come to fruition under the law of probabilities.'"

This statement crystallizes the high bar plaintiffs face when attempting to circumvent workers' compensation exclusivity. Even patterns of negligent behavior—conduct that might support substantial damages in a civil lawsuit—remain protected by the Act's immunity provisions unless they cross the threshold into virtual certainty of harm.

Implications for Employers and Employees

This decision reinforces several essential principles for workplace injury cases:

OSHA violations and safety lapses, even when documented, do not automatically create civil liability. Employers can be found negligent under safety regulations while still remaining protected by workers' compensation immunity.
The "substantially certain" standard is challenging to meet. Knowledge of danger, failure to implement available safety measures, and even inadequate training may not suffice without evidence that the employer knew injury was virtually certain to occur.
Context matters, but broadly. Courts evaluate whether injuries fall within the usual risks of industrial employment, not whether specific circumstances were unusual. The pandemic-driven staffing shortage and task reassignment were considered within the scope of ordinary workplace conditions.
Recklessness and gross negligence remain insufficient. These elevated forms of negligence, while potentially supporting punitive damages in tort actions, do not meet the intentional wrong standard under workers' compensation law.

Conclusion

The Little decision exemplifies the judiciary's continued commitment to preserving the workers' compensation system's fundamental bargain. While the outcome may seem harsh for an employee who suffered a serious injury due to his employer's apparent safety failings, the court's reasoning reflects a policy choice: maintaining a system that provides certain, if limited, compensation for all work-related injuries in exchange for employer immunity from potentially catastrophic civil judgments.

For injured workers like Jonathan Little, the path forward lies within the workers' compensation system—a system designed to provide medical care and wage replacement without the need to prove fault, but one that precludes the possibility of pain-and-suffering damages or punitive awards available in civil litigation.

This delicate balance continues to define New Jersey employment law, leaving the "intentional wrong" exception as a narrow gateway that few injured employees can pass through.

Little v. VDM Metals, A-0561-24, 2025 WL 3276688 (NJ App. Div. 2025) UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION. This opinion shall not “constitute precedent or be binding upon any court.” Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Recommended Citation: Gelman, Jon L., Workers' Compensation Bar Prevails, Workers ' Compensation Blog, 11/29/2025.