Today the Supreme Court heard one of the most consequential pesticide preemption cases in decades. At stake: whether state failure-to-warn claims against Monsanto's Roundup herbicide are preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The Court's eventual ruling will send shockwaves through workers' compensation and occupational disease litigation nationwide.
A Missouri jury found that Monsanto's Roundup — containing the active ingredient glyphosate — required a cancer warning that the EPA had not mandated. Monsanto, supported by the Trump administration as amicus curiae, argued that FIFRA's express preemption clause bars any state labeling requirement that is "in addition to or different from" federal requirements established through the EPA's pesticide registration process. Respondent John Durnell countered that EPA registration creates only prima facie evidence of labeling compliance, rebuttable evidence, and that FIFRA's own text, at section 136a(f)(2), explicitly provides that registration "shall not be a defense" to violations of the statute, including misbranding.
Paul Clement, arguing for Monsanto, advanced two theories: express preemption under FIFRA's uniformity clause and impossibility preemption, on the ground that EPA regulations prohibit registrants from unilaterally altering safety warnings. Principal Deputy Solicitor General Sarah Harris reinforced that the federal label-change process is rigorous and holistic, requiring data submission, exposure analysis, and EPA sign-off before any cancer warning can be added. Ashley Keller, for Durnell, argued that Monsanto had never pointed to a single word in FIFRA's text that would make EPA registration decisions binding labeling requirements with preemptive force, and that, under Loper Bright, the agency's regulations lack the textual delegation needed to preempt state tort law.
The Justices Were Engaged — and Divided
Justice Jackson pressed hard on the 15-year registration cycle, asking why state tort law could not enforce the no-misbranding requirement in the years between federal reregistrations when new scientific evidence emerges. Justice Gorsuch pointed out the apparent inconsistency: if states can ban a pesticide outright under FIFRA section 136v(a), why can't they impose tort liability for failure to warn? Justice Kavanaugh seemed sympathetic to Monsanto, framing state tort verdicts as imposing retroactive liability for conduct the EPA had expressly approved. Justice Kagan pressed Keller on what "uniformity" could mean if different juries in different states can reach opposite factual conclusions.
Why This Matters for Workers' Compensation
If the Court rules broadly for Monsanto, finding that EPA registration decisions preempt state failure-to-warn claims, the impact on workers' compensation will be significant and layered:
Workers injured by federally registered pesticides, herbicides, and other regulated chemical products routinely pursue third-party tort claims against manufacturers alongside their workers' compensation remedies. A ruling preempting state failure-to-warn claims would eliminate that avenue entirely for occupational exposures involving an employer's use of an EPA-registered product. The workers' compensation system, already the exclusive remedy against employers, would become the only remedy, period — no matter how dangerous the product proved to be.
Farm workers, landscapers, groundskeepers, nursery workers, and others with chronic occupational exposure to glyphosate are among the most vulnerable. Many of those cases already involve occupational disease claims, including non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, filed both as workers' compensation claims and as third-party product liability actions. Preemption would sever the tort track.
Occupational Disease Cases: The Sharpest Edge
Occupational disease claims under workers' compensation statutes involve long latency periods, cancers, and pulmonary diseases that manifest years or decades after exposure. This timing makes the preemption question especially acute. A worker exposed to glyphosate in 2010 may not develop lymphoma until 2025. During that 15-year window, new science on glyphosate's carcinogenicity may have emerged — precisely the "interregnum" Justice Jackson flagged. If preemption locks in the 1974 or 1993 EPA registration label as the definitive word on safety, occupational disease claimants lose the ability to argue that the manufacturer should have warned them based on intervening evidence.
The Court's Bates v. Dow Agrosciences (2005) precedent, which held that some state tort claims survive FIFRA preemption, was repeatedly invoked by both sides. Respondent's counsel argued that Bates contemplated tort suits as a "catalyst" for label evolution. Monsanto's counsel countered that Bates was primarily an efficacy case and that safety warnings stand on different, preemption-susceptible ground.
Also looming in the background: the Loper Bright framework. Keller argued that EPA regulations lacking express statutory delegation of preemptive authority cannot preempt valid state law, a potentially transformative principle if the Court adopts it in the preemption context.
Takeaway for Practitioners
New Jersey workers' compensation practitioners handling occupational disease claims, silica, asbestos, pesticide, and chemical exposure cases, should watch this decision carefully. A ruling for Monsanto on broad grounds could contract the universe of viable third-party claims that parallel the workers' compensation case, reducing overall recovery for injured workers and shifting costs entirely onto the compensation system. A ruling for Durnell would preserve the current landscape in which state tort juries remain the backstop for occupational chemical exposure that federal regulators have been slow to address.
A decision is expected before the end of the term.
Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068 — Supreme Court of the United States — Argued April 27, 2026
*Jon L. Gelman of Wayne, NJ, is the author of NJ Workers' Compensation Law (West-Thomson-Reuters) and co-author of the national treatise Modern Workers' Compensation Law (West-Thomson-Reuters).
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