When an employer's insurance carrier drags its feet, the consequences can be severe. In Kneezel v. Lambertville House (Unpublished Decision), a New Jersey appellate panel affirmed an order that struck a respondent's defenses and directed it to authorize a worker's knee replacement surgery. The decision is a sharp reminder that the Workers’ Compensation Act is built for speed, and that procedural gamesmanship around discovery and motion practice will not be rewarded.
How the Case Arose
Roger Kneezel worked as Lambertville House's property manager for eighteen years. On December 22, 2019, he slipped on a wet tile while carrying two four-gallon buckets of water, injuring his back and left knee. The parties stipulated that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment, satisfying the threshold of N.J.S.A. 34:15-1. Over the next several years, Kneezel received authorized treatment, epidural injections, lumbar decompression surgery, and knee injections, all paid for by the employer.
By 2024, Kneezel's knee pain had returned, and his examining physician, Dr. Dhimant Balar, opined within a reasonable degree of medical probability that the knee symptoms were directly related to the 2019 accident and recommended a total knee replacement. The employer denied the treatment, relying on surveillance investigators and a defense medical report attributing the knee problems to pre-existing osteoarthritis. Kneezel filed a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits (an “MMT”).
The Discovery Breakdown
The turning point was discovery. Under N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.11(a)(4)(i), once a petitioner has testified, a party intending to use surveillance evidence must disclose it to the testifying party. Kneezel testified on November 18, 2024. Despite multiple conferences, rescheduled testimony dates, and direct email warnings from the judge, Lambertville did not produce the names and CVs of its investigators, the surveillance reports, or the full “raw feed” of footage, even as it surfaced new surveillance dates with no accompanying reports. More than four months passed without compliance.
On February 21, 2025, Kneezel moved to strike Lambertville's defenses. Lambertville filed no opposition at all. After a final warning that non-production would result in entry of the order, the judge entered an order on March 20, 2025, striking the defenses and directing the knee surgery. A motion for reconsideration and a stay were denied, and this appeal followed.
The Court’s Rationale
The Appellate Division reviewed the judge of compensation's findings under the deferential standard of De Angelo v. Alsan Masons: findings stand if they could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence, and will not be disturbed unless arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. Legal interpretations, by contrast, receive no special deference.
1. No due-process violation. Lambertville's central argument was that it was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The panel disagreed. Due process is flexible, requiring an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” (Doe v. Poritz). Here, the employer received notice and multiple opportunities through repeated conferences and communications. It was Lambertville's own repeated failure to comply with simple judicial directives — not any denial of process — that produced the order.
2. The motion was properly treated as uncontested. Lambertville pointed to N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.5(c), which says motions to suppress defenses “shall be listed for a hearing.” But subsection (b) provides that a motion is deemed uncontested unless responsive papers are filed within fourteen days. Lambertville filed nothing. The court held that no hearing is required on a truly uncontested motion, and that the “no material dispute of fact” exception in N.J.A.C.12:235-3.12(e)(1) applied.
3. Substantial compliance did not save the employer. Lambertville argued its “ongoing discussions” and “continued disclosures” amounted to de facto opposition and substantial compliance under Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow. The doctrine requires, among other things, a reasonable explanation for non-compliance and a lack of prejudice. The court found neither — the delay deteriorated Kneezel's knee and delayed his benefits, and called the invocation “disingenuous.”
4. Striking defenses was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, Lambertville urged that the proper remedy was to compel production or exclude the evidence, not the “ultimate sanction.” Reviewing for abuse of discretion under C.A. ex rel. In Applegrad v. Bentolila, the panel found ample justification for deferral. The employer had months of clear warnings and still failed, and also failed to oppose the motion to strike.
The Takeaway
Kneezel v. Lambertville House confirms that the workers’ compensation forum will protect its core promise of prompt medical care. Procedural rigor is not a formality; it is the mechanism by which injured workers receive timely treatment. Employers who treat discovery deadlines and motion practice casually may find that their best evidence never reaches the bench.Sources & Authorities
About the Author
Why Workers’ Compensation Principles Drove the Result
The outcome cannot be understood without an understanding of the Workers’ Compensation Act's architecture. The Act obligates an employer to furnish treatment necessary “to cure and relieve the worker of the effects of the injury” (N.J.S.A. 34:15-15), and it is to be liberally construed so its beneficent purposes are accomplished (Squeo v. Comfort Control Corp.). The system exists to provide a “quick, efficient remedy” for work-connected injury. MMT practice reinforces that goal: motions must be listed peremptorily within thirty days, and supporting certifications and medical reports can establish a prima facie case sufficient to compel relief unless the respondent meaningfully opposes.
Against that backdrop, the panel read the regulations through the Act's remedial lens, quoting Squeo's admonition that courts construe the Act to comport with its “presumptive beneficent and remedial objectives favorable to injured workmen rather than to be bound by its coldly literal import.” In other words, the statute's speed-and-care purpose is itself an interpretive tool that disfavors the employer's delay.
Against that backdrop, the panel read the regulations through the Act's remedial lens, quoting Squeo's admonition that courts construe the Act to comport with its “presumptive beneficent and remedial objectives favorable to injured workmen rather than to be bound by its coldly literal import.” In other words, the statute's speed-and-care purpose is itself an interpretive tool that disfavors the employer's delay.
Impact on Workers Who Need Medical Treatment
For injured workers, Kneezel is meaningful even though it is unpublished. Its practical lessons:
• Delay has teeth. A carrier that withholds discovery after a petitioner testifies risks losing its defenses entirely — not merely an evidentiary exclusion.
• Silence is fatal. Failing to file responsive papers within fourteen days converts a motion to strike into an uncontested one that can be granted without a hearing.
• A solid prima facie case matters. Credible testimony, plus a treating physician's report linking the need for care to the accident, can support an MMT, especially where the opposition is procedurally defaulted.
• Care comes first. Where harm to the worker from denied treatment outweighs harm to the employer, the equities favor authorizing the care.
The Takeaway
Kneezel v. Lambertville House confirms that the workers’ compensation forum will protect its core promise of prompt medical care. Procedural rigor is not a formality; it is the mechanism by which injured workers receive timely treatment. Employers who treat discovery deadlines and motion practice casually may find that their best evidence never reaches the bench.Sources & Authorities
• Kneezel v. Lambertville House, 2026 WL 1532635 (App. Div. June 1, 2026)
• McGory v. SLS Landscaping, 463 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2020)
• Squeo v. Comfort Control Corp., 99 N.J. 588 (1985)
• Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995)
• Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998)
• C.A. ex rel. Applegrad v. Bentolila, 219 N.J. 449 (2014)
• De Angelo v. Alsan Masons, Inc., 122 N.J. Super. 88 (App. Div. 1973)
• Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982)
• N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 & 34:15-15 (Workers’ Compensation Act)
• N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.2, 3.5, 3.11, 3.12 (DWC motion & discovery rules)
• McGory v. SLS Landscaping, 463 N.J. Super. 437 (App. Div. 2020)
• Squeo v. Comfort Control Corp., 99 N.J. 588 (1985)
• Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995)
• Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998)
• C.A. ex rel. Applegrad v. Bentolila, 219 N.J. 449 (2014)
• De Angelo v. Alsan Masons, Inc., 122 N.J. Super. 88 (App. Div. 1973)
• Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982)
• N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 & 34:15-15 (Workers’ Compensation Act)
• N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.2, 3.5, 3.11, 3.12 (DWC motion & discovery rules)
About the Author
Jon L. Gelman of Wayne, NJ is the author of NJ Workers' Compensation Law (West-Thomson-Reuters) and co-author of Modern Workers' Compensation Law (West-Thomson-Reuters).
Blog: Workers' Compensation | LinkedIn: JonGelman | Substack: jongelman.substack.com | Blue Sky: jongelman@bsky.social
© 2026 Jon L Gelman. All rights reserved. | Attorney Advertising | Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
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