In workers' compensation, a one-day delay can be an expensive day. That is the lesson of Van Skiver v. Alessandra Miscellaneous Metal Works, Inc., decided by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, on June 18, 2026. The court affirmed monetary sanctions against an employer whose workers' compensation insurer, Liberty Mutual, released a permanency check on day sixty-one of a sixty-day statutory payment window. The penalty totaled 25 percent of the award, plus interest, counsel fees, and costs.
For attorneys, claims professionals, human resources personnel, and employers, the decision is a clear reminder that statutory deadlines for paying injured workers are enforced, and that a court may impose meaningful penalties when an insurer cannot prove timely payment.
The Facts: A Settlement, a Lien, and a Missed Deadline
David Van Skiver was injured in a workplace accident on February 14, 2019. On December 4, 2024, a New Jersey Judge of Workers' Compensation entered an Order Approving Settlement awarding him $24,381 for permanent disability. Under N.J.S.A. 34:15-28, the employer had sixty days from entry of the order to pay the award, a deadline that fell on February 2, 2025.
Petitioner's counsel did everything right. Counsel emailed the order to the employer's attorney on December 9, promptly answered a question about a child support lien, and then followed up repeatedly when no payment arrived, on January 14, January 16, January 31, February 3, and again with requests for overnight delivery to avoid penalties. The employer's side largely went silent.
On the afternoon of February 3, Liberty Mutual claims adjuster Michael Forward emailed to say he had checks he could release later that day. Counsel asked for confirmation of mailing and received none. Van Skiver did not receive his first permanency check until February 6, 2025, four days after the statutory deadline had passed.
The Trial Court: Sanctions and a Failed Reconsideration
On April 9, 2025, the Judge of Workers' Compensation found the employer had failed to comply with the December 4 order and awarded interest and sanctions of $5,028.18, equal to 25 percent of the original payment due, plus attorney's fees of $1,523.75 and costs of $750. The employer moved for reconsideration and put on testimony.
At the hearing, a Liberty Mutual claims manager testified that the check had been issued on January 31, 2025, explaining that the print cycle began at 10:30 p.m. and the check was released the next morning with a date postmarked the following day. On cross-examination, however, the critical admissions came out. She conceded she had no way to verify the postmark date, no proof that the check was actually mailed before February 2, no copy of the envelope, and no way to obtain one. She had, in her own words, only the company's protocol, not evidence that the protocol had been followed in this case.
Relying on that testimony and the adjuster's own February 3 email, the judge found the check was actually released on February 3, sixty-one days after the order. He denied reconsideration and reinstated the April 9 sanctions order.
The Court's Rationale on Appeal
The Appellate Division affirmed, and its reasoning rests on three pillars: a deferential standard of review, the text of the governing statutes, and the employer's failure of proof.
First, the standard of review. Review of factual findings by a Judge of Compensation is limited. Under Renner v. AT&T, 218 N.J. 435 (2014), and longstanding administrative law principles, an appellate court will not disturb an agency determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or lacks fair support in the evidence. A decision to impose a penalty is reviewed only for abuse of discretion, citing Ripp v. County of Hudson, 472 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 2022).
Second, the statutory framework. N.J.S.A. 34:15-28 provides that whenever lawful compensation is withheld from an injured worker for sixty or more days following entry of a judgment or order, simple interest may be added at the division's discretion. Separately, N.J.S.A. 34:15-28.2 authorizes a Judge of Compensation to act when a party fails to comply with an order, including imposing costs, interest, and an additional assessment not to exceed 25 percent of the money due for unreasonable payment delay, plus reasonable legal fees to enforce the order.
The court was careful to note that these statutes are permissive, not mandatory. The sixty-day mark does not automatically trigger a penalty. Under Ripp, a penalty under section 28.2(a) is justified only to enforce the court's order and only where there is an unreasonable delay in payment. Here, the judge found exactly that: an unexplained delay, a lack of communication, and a failure to provide any confirmation of mailing.
Third, the failure of proof. The employer argued on appeal that payment was timely because the check was issued on day fifty-eight. But the record did not support that claim. With no postmark, no envelope, and no confirmation of mailing, the employer could not rebut the finding that the check actually went out on day sixty-one. The court held that substantial credible evidence supported the judge's finding that the delay was unreasonable and that the 25 percent sanction was not excessive because it tracked the maximum expressly authorized by statute.
How Liberty Mutual Failed to Abide by the Order
Workers' compensation is a no-fault system built on a promise: in exchange for giving up the right to sue, an injured worker receives prompt and certain benefits. The payment deadline in N.J.S.A. 34:15-28 is the mechanism that makes the promise real. When the insurer controls the payment process, the insurer bears the practical burden of proving that the deadline was met.
Liberty Mutual's failure here was not only a missed calendar date, it was a failure of documentation and communication. The carrier relied on a general account of its internal print cycle rather than evidence tied to this specific check. It could not produce a postmark, could not produce the envelope, and did not confirm mailing when petitioner's counsel repeatedly asked for that confirmation. Counsel's diligent paper trail of follow-up emails stood in sharp contrast to the carrier's silence, and the court weighed that contrast against the employer.
The practical lesson for carriers is direct: a protocol is not proof. If a payment deadline is enforced by penalty, the party in control of payment should be able to show, with admissible evidence, exactly when the payment left its hands.
Impact on the Delivery of Benefits to Injured Workers
The decision strengthens the enforceability of payment deadlines for injured workers in New Jersey. Although the relevant statutes are discretionary, Van Skiver confirms that a Judge of Compensation may use that discretion to impose the maximum 25 percent assessment, plus interest and fees, when a carrier cannot justify a late payment. That prospect gives the deadline real teeth.
For injured workers and their counsel, the case underscores the importance of careful, contemporaneous documentation. The follow-up emails, the requests for overnight delivery, and the prompt motions to compel and to modify the award collectively built a record supporting sanctions. For employers and insurers, the message is to prioritize timely payment, maintain verifiable mailing records, and respond to counsel rather than rely on internal routines that cannot be proven after the fact.
Importantly, the case fits within a developing body of New Jersey law, alongside Ripp, that distinguishes between delays that genuinely justify enforcement penalties and those that do not. In Ripp, the appellate court reversed a maximum penalty that had been based in part on pre-order litigation delays. In Van Skiver, by contrast, the penalty was tied squarely to an unreasonable, post-order failure to pay, exactly the situation the statute targets.
Key Takeaways
• A single day matters. Releasing payment on day sixty-one, rather than within sixty days, exposed the employer to a 25 percent sanction plus interest, fees, and costs.• A protocol is not proof. Testimony about a general print cycle did not establish that this check was mailed on time. No postmark, no envelope, and no mailing confirmation doomed the timeliness argument.• The statutes are permissive, not automatic. N.J.S.A. 34:15-28 and 34:15-28.2 let a judge impose penalties for an unreasonable delay, but do not require them.• Unreasonable delay is the trigger. Silence, missed deadlines, and a failure to confirm mailing supported the finding that the delay was unreasonable.• Deference protects the trial judge's findings. Factual findings supported by substantial, credible evidence are reviewed only for abuse of discretion and are difficult to overturn on appeal.• Documentation wins. The petitioner's contemporaneous email trail and prompt motions built the record that justified sanctions.• The carrier bears practical risk. When the insurer controls payment, the inability to prove timely mailing is held against the employer.
Sources
Van Skiver v. Alessandra Miscellaneous Metal Works, Inc., No. A-2912-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2026)(unpublished), 2026 WL 1758291.
N.J.S.A. 34:15-28 (payment deadline and interest).
N.J.S.A. 34:15-28.2 (penalties for failure to comply with orders).
About the Author
Jon L. Gelman of Wayne, NJ is the author of NJ Workers' Compensation Law (West-Thomson-Reuters) and co-author of Modern Workers' Compensation Law (West-Thomson-Reuters).
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