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Showing posts sorted by date for query premises. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query premises. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Thursday, July 7, 2016

Toxic-Tort: NJ Supreme Court Holds That an Employer Has a Duty to a Household Contact

"We hold that the Olivo duty of care may, in proper circumstances, extend beyond a spouse of a worker exposed to the toxin that is the basis for a take-home toxic-tort theory of liability." Justice LaVecchia, NJ Supreme Court

An employer's duty to a employee's household contact was the focus of decision announced by the NJ Supreme Court. The NJ Supreme Court reviewed the question, that was certified by the US Third Circuit Court of Appeals, to define the duty and its scope. The household contact, the finance, subsequently spouse, suffered beryllium related disease causally related to the employee's toxic exposure.

The case arose out of a household contact's exposure to beryllium brought home on the employee's cloths. At the time of the exposure, 30 years ago, the household contact was the fiance of the employee.

"The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit having certified to the Supreme Court the following question of law pursuant to Rule 2:12-1:And the Court having determined to accept the question as certified."Does the premises liability rule set forth in Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 895 A.2d 1143 (2006), extend beyond providing a duty of care to the spouse of a person exposed to toxic substances on the landowner's premises, and, if so, what are the limits of that liability rule and the associated scope of duty?

SYLLABUS 
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court.  It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader.  It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court.  Please note that, in the interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.) 
Brenda Ann Schwartz v. Accuratus Corporation (A-73-14) (076195) 
Argued April 25, 2016 -- Decided July 6, 2016 
LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. 

In this appeal, the Court considers the following question of law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:  Does the premises liability rule set forth in Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394 (2006) extend beyond providing a duty of care to the spouse of a person exposed to toxic substances on the landowner’s premises, and, if so, what are the limits on that liability rule and the associated scope of duty? 

The action before the Third Circuit involves plaintiffs Brenda Ann and Paul Schwartz.  After Brenda was diagnosed with chronic beryllium disease, the Schwartzes filed a complaint raising claims of negligence, products liability, and strict liability against defendant Accuratus Ceramic Corporation (Accuratus), a ceramics facility where Paul had worked in 1978 and 1979.  In 1979, Paul began sharing an apartment with an Accuratus co-worker, Gregory Altemose.  At the time, Paul and Brenda were dating and Brenda frequently visited and stayed overnight at the apartment.  After the couple married in June 1980, Brenda and Paul resided in the apartment, where Altemose also continued to live.  Brenda performed laundry and other chores at the apartment, both when she stayed with Paul prior to their marriage and after she moved in as Paul’s wife.   

The complaint alleges that employees at Accuratus’s facility were exposed to beryllium, which, according to plaintiffs, may result in cancer and other diseases of the lungs and skin.  Plaintiffs allege that Brenda was subjected to take-home beryllium exposure due to Paul and Altemose bringing the substance home from Accuratus on their work clothing.  Thus, plaintiffs’ take-home-toxin theory of liability is based in part on Brenda’s exposure to beryllium for the period that she frequently stayed over at the apartment prior to her marriage to Paul.  Additionally, the take-home-toxin theory encompasses the time period after the marriage, premised on the theory that Altemose continued to bring the substance home to the shared apartment from his work at the Accuratus facility. 
Originally filed in Pennsylvania state court, plaintiffs’ case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Plaintiffs’ motion to remand was denied.  The federal district court concluded that “neither [New Jersey nor Pennsylvania] has recognized a duty of an employer to protect a worker’s non-spouse . . . roommate from take-home exposure to a toxic substance.”  The court pointed to Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394 (2006) as support for that proposition.  The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, commenting that to interpret Olivo as supporting a duty to Brenda would “stretch the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision . . . beyond its tensile strength.”  After the Schwartzes filed an amended complaint, Accuratus filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted.  The federal district court concluded as a matter of law that Accuratus did not owe a duty of care to Brenda. 

Following additional motion practice, the Schwartzes filed a notice of appeal with the Third Circuit.  The Third Circuit filed a Petition for Certification of a Question of State Law, pursuant to Rule 2:12A-1, which the Court accepted.  222 N.J. 304 (2015). 

HELD:  The duty of care recognized in Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394 (2006) may, in proper circumstances, extend beyond a spouse of a worker exposed to a workplace toxin that is the basis for a take-home toxic-tort theory of liability.  
1. The threshold question certified by the Third Circuit -- whether the premises liability rule set forth in Olivo may extend beyond providing a duty of care to the spouse of a person exposed to toxic substances on the landowner’s premises -- necessitates a review of Olivo and the reasoning that led to its holding.  In Olivo, the Court considered whether a landowner could be liable for injuries allegedly caused from asbestos exposure experienced by the wife of a worker who had performed welding and steam fitting tasks that brought him into contact with asbestos on the landowner’s premises.  There, the Court explained “whether a duty of care can be owed to one who is injured from a dangerous condition on the premises, to which the victim is exposed off-premises, devolves to a question of foreseeability of the risk of harm to that individual or identifiable class of individuals.”  Id. at 403.  Once foreseeability is established, a court must evaluate whether recognition of a duty accords with fairness, justness, and predictability, applying the following factors derived, in part, from Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993):  (1) the relationship of the parties, namely the relationship between plaintiff and defendant; (2) the nature of the attendant risk, including the danger of the toxin at issue and how easily the toxin is transmitted and causes injury (the greater the danger, the greater the duty); (3) the opportunity and ability to exercise care; and (4) the public interest in the proposed solution.  (pp. 7-9)   

2. Based on the facts presented in Olivo’s summary judgment record, the Court determined that the landowner should have foreseen that sending unprotected, soiled work clothes home on the backs of workers would result in their clothes being laundered.  That placed the person, who could be expected to perform the task of handling and laundering the unprotected work clothing, in regular and close contact with material that had become infiltrated with asbestos in the worksite.  As a result, the Court held that a duty of care to protect on-site workers from exposure to friable asbestos in the worksite extended to spouses “handling the workers’ unprotected work clothing based on the foreseeable risk of exposure from asbestos borne home on [the workers’] contaminated clothing.”  Olivo, supra, 186 N.J. at 404-05 (emphasis added).  Applying the Hopkins factors, the Court concluded that fairness and justness would be served by extending off-premises liability in that setting.  (pp. 9-11)

3. In so holding, the Court determined that the landowner’s concerns about essentially limitless liability were unfounded because the duty recognized under the circumstances of Olivo was “focused on the particularized foreseeability of harm to plaintiff’s wife.”  Id. at 405.  That concise statement cannot be taken out of its context -- a duty was found to exist based on the foreseeability of regular and close contact with the contaminated material over an extended period of time.  Id. at 404-05.  The duty of care for take-home toxic-tort liability discussed in Olivo was not defined by the role of lawfully wedded spouse to someone who worked on the landowner’s premises.  Rather, it was foreseeable that Eleanor (plaintiff’s wife) would be handling and laundering the plaintiff’s soiled, asbestos-exposed clothes, which the landowner failed to protect at work and allowed to be taken home by workers.  That easily foreseeable, regular, and close contact with the dangerous condition produced the conclusion that the landowner could be held liable to Eleanor for her injuries.  (pp. 11-13)

4. Tort law is built on case-by-case development based on the facts presented by individual cases.  The evolution of case law must reflect the simultaneous evolution of societal values and public policy.  Olivo does not suggest that the duty recognized must remain static for all future cases -- no matter the pleadings and proofs, including unknown aspects of other toxins -- and that take-home toxic-tort liability must remain limited to a spouse handling take-home toxins.  Olivo does not state, explicitly or implicitly, that a duty of care for take-home toxic-tort liability cannot extend beyond a spouse.  Nor does it base liability on some definition of “household” member, or even on the basis of biological or familial relationships.  Olivo must be recognized as a step in the development of the common law, which of necessity is built case by case on individual factual circumstances.  (pp. 13-16)

5. The Court cannot define the contours of the duty owed to others in a take-home toxic-tort action through a certified question of law.  While there may be situations in which household members are in contact with toxins brought home on clothing, a refined analysis for particularized risk, foreseeability, and fairness requires a case-by-case assessment in toxic-tort settings.  Although the Court cannot predict the direction in which the common law will evolve, the Court identifies certain factors that will be important as such cases present themselves.  In sum, the duty of care recognized in Olivo may extend, in appropriate circumstances, to a plaintiff who is not a spouse.  The assessment should take into account a weighing of the factors identified herein to determine whether the foreseeability, fairness, and predictability concerns of Hopkins should lead to the conclusion that a duty of care should be recognized under common law.  (pp. 16-19)

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion. 

Related articles:
Mar 28, 2015 ... A $1.6 Million award for a household contact of an asbestos worker was affirmed by a NJ Court of Appeals. The child of a Shulton employee ...
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May 1, 2010 ... The case involved a household contact exposure to asbestos fiber. The wife of the asbestos worker was exposed to asbestos fiber on the ...
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Nov 29, 2013 ... One would think that we woud have learned of the serious medical problems caused by the consequences of being a household contact to an ...
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Oct 11, 2011 ... Labels: asbestos; brakes; chrysotile; mechanic; occupation; epidemiology; mesothelioma, Asthma, Bystander Exposure, household contact, ...
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Thursday, May 19, 2016

NJ Supreme Court Hears Argument on Employer's Duty to Household Contact

An employer's duty to a employee's household contact was the focus of an oral argument recently before the NJ Supreme Court. The NJ Supreme Court reviewed the question, that was certified by the US Third Circuit Court of Appeals, to define the duty and its scope. The household contact, the fiance, subsequently spouse, suffered beryllium related disease causally related to the employee's toxic exposure.

Friday, April 1, 2016

NJ Supreme Court to Review An Increase of Partial Disability Award in Total Disability Claim

One of the basic tenants of workers' compensation is that awards maybe reviewed and modified where the medical status has changed.1 The NJ Supreme Court on March 14, 2016 granted Certification to review a favorable Appellate Court ruling that permitted a totally and permanently disabled injured worker to receive an increase of a prior (2006 injury) partial disability award, even though the worker had been declared to be totally and permanently disability from a subsequent (2008 injury) injury.

Friday, March 18, 2016

NJ Judge Orders Psychotherapy Sessions In Conjunction With Pain Management

A NJ Workers' Compensation Judge Ordered the continuation of medical services to an injured worker who has been struggling for years because of chronic knee pain depression and anxiety despite the objection of the employer who sought to terminate care. The Judge Philip A. Tornetta, Administrative Supervisory  Judge of Compensation, adopted an innovative approach  in attempt to reduce or eliminated prescribed drugs including, "Oxycontin for her knee  pain, Lexapro for depression and Xanax, which helps her sleep."

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

On Premises Assault by Co-Worker Held Not Compensable

The NJ Appellate Court decided that an assault by a fellow co-worker on the employment premises did not arise out of the employment and was not compensable. In reaching the opinion based on a narrow set of facts, the Court implemented the "Positional Risk Doctrine," rationalizing that the event that triggered the incident was not linked to the employment.

"....The ‘but for’ or positional risk doctrine includes as one of its components the nature of the risk that causes the injury. These include:
(1) The risk distinctly associated with the [e]mployment – all the obvious kinds of injury .... machinery breaking,
(2) Neutral risks – uncontrollable [c]ircumstances that do not originate in the [e]mployment but rather happen to befall the [e]mployee during the course of – acts of God[, s]uch as lightening. Such injuries are [c]ompensable.
(3) Risks personal to the employee – the [p]ersonal proclivities or contacts of the [e]mployee which give rise to the harm"

The assault occurred in the break room, while the employee was sleeping and arose out of pyramid money scheme that was known as a “susu.”

"....that the attack in this case arose from personal motivation and was not attributable to a risk of employment or to uncontrollable circumstances. Had petitioner not been a participant in his assistant's susu, the attack would not have occurred. Once he became involved and questioned his assistant about the “invested” money, he was attacked at a location that just happened to be their place of employment.

Joseph v Monmouth County, DOCKET NO. A–4044–13T3, (N.J. App. Div. 2015), 2015 WL 8547502. (This decision was not approved for publication.)

….

Jon L. Gelman of Wayne NJ is the author of NJ Workers’ Compensation Law (West-Thompson-Reuters) and co-author of the national treatise, Modern Workers’ Compensation Law (West-Thompson-Reuters). For over 4 decades the Law Offices of Jon L Gelman  1.973.696.7900  jon@gelmans.com  have been representing injured workers and their families who have suffered occupational accidents and illnesses.

Monday, July 27, 2015

Home is an Odyssey For The Aging Population

Workers' Compensation over the decades has had a very narrow and limited view of "home improvement" benefits for an aging and disabled workforce. That view is focussed on the immediate and maybe a 5 year plan going into the future. With increasing life expectancy of the entire population the workers' compensation system will need to adapt to what is considered "home" and adapt to new factors in an ever changing world.

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Misclassification: US Dept of Labor Issues Interpretation of Employment Status

The Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “Suffer or Permit” Standard in the Identification of Employees Who Are Misclassified as Independent Contractors.

Sounding very much like a workers' compensation standardized employment status test, the US Department of Labor has added its interpretation this developing area of the law. This memo will has obvious added consequences to state interpretation to this issue. 

Thursday, December 18, 2014

Obesity is a disability. Employers should start treating it that way.

Today's post is shared from washingtonpost.com/ Helen Leahey is a Welsh journalist and documentary filmmaker who works in education management.


Job interviews are an uncomfortable experience for most people. But for people like me who suffer from morbid obesity, they are especially grueling. It’s hard to impress someone when you’re the fat applicant. There’s the added challenge of sustaining an engaging conversation as a potential future employer walks you around the premises, a hike that leaves you winded. After that, you have to squeeze into a tiny chair and present your credentials, maintaining a charming demeanor as the blood circulation to the lower half of your body is cut off. I went through this process over and over again while I was searching for a job. I did land one eventually, as a manager in one of the world’s leading business schools. But my problems didn’t end there. Because of my handicap, co-workers had to take over tasks that I couldn’t manage – mainly those that involved climbing any number of stairs or walking more than 20 feet.

It is clear to me that morbid obesity — defined as having a body mass index above 40 — is often a disability, irrelevant of the cause. But in many legal systems, that’s still an unanswered question. Even as obesity rates have soared, U.S. and European courts have grappled with whether to classify it as a disability, which would obligate employers to provide necessary accommodations so obese employees can...
[Click here to see the rest of this post]

Tuesday, December 9, 2014

Home Modifications Denied as to An Elevator

Home modifications can be a very important, yet expensive, benefit available to injured workers. A New Jersey Appellate Court again reviewed the standard of proof for home modifications required to accommodate disabled workers. In doing so The Court  linked the need for medical evidence to be supported medical evidence when the improvement of mental health of the disabled worker is  at issue.

The standard of proof, was enunciated almost 3 decades by the NJ Supreme Court :
“Where the surroundings of the petitioner must be modified in order to accommodate his physical handicap, the court has required that the employer be responsible for making the adaptations. Not only is the physical well-being of the injured worker taken into consideration, but his mental state is considered as well. In the Squeo case, the employer was required to pay for the construction of an accessible apartment as an addition to the premises of the injured worker’s parents’ home.”  Squeo v. Comfort Control Corp., 194 N.J.Super. 366, 476 A.2d 1265 (App.Div.1984), aff’d 99 N.J. 588, 494 A.2d 313 (1985), N.J. Prac., Workers’ Compensation Law § 15.3 (3d ed.)

A partially paralyzed and wheelchair bound disabled worker requested home modifications of his residence to include: expansion of the kitchen, raising the family room floor, installation of a lift platform and an elevator. The employer contested several aspects including the installation of an elevator.

No medical evidence was offered by way of expert testimony to causally related the improvement of the injured workers’ mental health with the installation of an elevator to continue with such hobbies as woodworking. While the Compensation Judge made two on-site visits, and even though the respondent wasn’t diligent in timely requesting expert medical testimony regarding the issue, a lack of findings on the causal relationship between the need for the elevator installation necessitated a reversal of the Compensation Judge’s order as to the elevator.

The Court rationalized that…” While the elevator would appear to be beneficial, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that it is "necessary" and its cost "reasonable" as those terms are used in Squeo. Ibid. The compensation judge was required to reach a decision consistent with Squeo, which "cautioned" that it is "only the unusual case that may warrant . . . extraordinary relief." Id. at 604. Based on the current state of the law, as set forth in Squeo, and the present record, we cannot agree that Loeber demonstrated that the elevator was "necessary."

The case was remanded to the Division of Workers’ Compensation so that the specific the remodeling could be resolved.

Loeber v. Fair Lawn Board of Education, A-1990-13T1 (NJ App Div 2014) Unreported

Friday, November 28, 2014

Rules of Dismissal Governed by Equitable Principles

In reversing a dismissal in Workers’ Compensation a NJ Court applied equitable principles as well as the guidance of the rules of the civil justice system. The inability of counsel to appear for what the Appellate Court deemed to be justifiable cause (conflicted with his obligation to serve as a court-appointed arbitrator in another court), resulted in a reversal of the dismissal.

“No petition shall be dismissed for want of prosecution or for failure to form-
ally adjourn the cause, until after notice shall be served by the respondent on
the petitioner or his attorney that unless the cause is moved for hearing within
one month from the date of the service thereof, the claim will be considered
abandoned and the petition dismissed subject, however, to the right to have the
petition reinstated for good cause shown, upon application made to the deputy
commissioner before whom the matter was heard or to the Commissioner of Labor
within one year thereafter. No claim heretofore made shall be considered abandoned because the petition was dismissed under this section, if such petition
has been reinstated for good cause shown, and such petition shall be deemed to
have been dismissed without prejudice to further proceedings upon said petition,
and further proceedings thereon shall be as effective as though said petition
had not been dismissed.” N.J.S.A. 34:15–51

The Court stated…… “Irrespective of the absence of express statutory authority and a one-year limitation imposed upon such a reopening in certain circumstances, N.J.S.A. 34:15–54, it is abundantly clear that the Division has the inherent power, “comparable to that possessed by the courts (R.R. 4:62–2 [now R. 4:50] ), to re-open judgments for fraud, mistake, inadvertence, or other equitable ground.” Beese v. First National Stores, 52 N.J. 196, 200 (1968). See also Estelle v.  Red Bank Bd. of Ed., 14 N.J. 256 (1954); Stone v. Dugan Brothers of N.J., 1 N.J.Super. 13 (App.Div.1948).”

“In the present case, we initially note that petitioner’s counsel was unable to appear to oppose the motion to dismiss because the hearing date conflicted with his obligation to serve as a court-appointed arbitrator in another court. We are unable to determine on this record why, under these circumstances, counsel’s seemingly valid adjournment request was denied. Counsel was then served with an order that referenced not only N.J.S.A. 34:15–54, but also a requirement that the case could not be restored unless it was ready to be tried or settled. Although petitioner’s surgery finally occurred in September 2011, within the one-year statutory period, the case was not ready until the doctor’s report was received on May 2, 2012. Petitioner then promptly moved to restore the case two weeks later.

“Arguably these circumstances may suffice to warrant equitable relief under Rule 4:50–1(f), especially should respondent be unable to demonstrate prejudice due to the delay beyond the one-year statutory period.

“In deciding the motion, the judge of compensation was clearly of the mistaken belief that he was unable to grant relief “[a]bsent specific authority in the statute.” To the contrary, the matter may be reopened if it qualifies under Rule 4:50–1(f), and even then, if the motion is found to have been brought within a reasonable time. See Hyman, supra, 157 N.J.Super. at 517. We conclude that this determination “is best made in the first instance by the judge of compensation, on a record fully developed for that purpose and accompanied by adequate findings.” Ibid. Accordingly we remand for a further hearing consistent with this opinion.
Remanded.

N.J.Super.A.D.,2014.
Not Reported in A.3d, 2014 WL 6634885 (N.J.Super.A.D.)


….
Jon L. Gelman of Wayne NJ is the author of NJ Workers’ Compensation Law (West-Thompson-Reuters) and co-author of the national treatise, Modern Workers’ Compensation Law (West-Thompson-Reuters). For over 4 decades the Law Offices of Jon L Gelman  1.973.696.7900  jon@gelmans.com  have been representing injured workers and their families who have suffered occupational accidents and illnesses.

Sunday, October 26, 2014

Modern Workplaces Add Complexity to Workers' Compenation Cases

Premises liability is a major issue currently in workers' compensation claims as people "work at home." The change by created by eliminating a commute also changes the pattern of risk. While the coming and going rule may be avoided there are other distractions at home that create new issues challenging compensability. Today's post is shared from thelegalintelligencer.com
A day at work isn't always just a day at the office. Attorneys in workers' compensation practice know that all too well. And as technological advances allow more workers to telecommute and correspond on work matters from outside of the office, the conditions surrounding compensable incidents are increasingly complicated.
"The ability of an employer to maintain access to an employee and the ability of an employer to give instructions to an employee remotely have increased," said Edward Neyhart, of the Law Offices of Byrne, Neyhart & Higgins. "As people work remotely more and more and people are engaging in various activities and mobile technology allows people greater access to travel and working away from the office setting, it becomes a much more important issue."
Neyhart said he has been inundated with workers' compensation cases this year, many borne out of a constant connection to the office.
"[These cases] are just the beginning of the pattern of litigation that is going to have to work its way up to the appellate courts," he said. "Employers and insurance companies have to adapt to the changing status of liability."
According to a 2010 survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, about 24 percent of workers telecommute, meaning they work from home for at least some of their hours each week. That can blur the lines on compensable injuries, especially for those who only work from home sometimes.
"It puts them in the...
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Wednesday, September 17, 2014

Cycling or walking to work 'improves psychological health'

Today's post is shared from medicalnewstoday.com

According to a new study conducted by health economists at the University of East Anglia and the Centre for Diet and Activity Research in the UK, walking or cycling to work is better for people's mental health than driving.
The psychological benefits of walking or cycling to work come on top of the well-known physical health benefits.
In February of this year, the UK Office of National Statistics published a report that found UK citizens who walked to work had lower life satisfaction than those who drove to work. The report also found that cyclists were less happy and more anxious than other commuters.
The new study, however - which is published in the journal Preventive Medicine - contradicts this.
The team studied 18 years of data from almost 18,000 commuters in the UK aged 18-65. The data took in various aspects of psychological health including feelings of worthlessness, unhappiness, sleepless nights and capability of dealing with problems.
Factors that are known to affect well-being, such as income, having children, moving house or job, and relationship changes were also taken into account by the researchers.
The results suggest that people benefited from improved well-being when they stopped driving and started walking or cycling to work. Commuters reported that they felt better able to concentrate and "less under strain" if they used these methods of travel, rather than...
[Click here to see the rest of this post]